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Összefoglalás: A műhelytanulmány célja egy folyamatban levő kutatás részeredményének 
ismertetése, s annak feltátása, hogy mely tényezők befolyásolják a magyar FMCG szektor 
ellátási lánc partnerkapcsolatainak struktúráját. A szerző az elemzés során egy hasonló, az 
Egyesült Királyságban végzett kutatás alapmodelljét használja fel, amelyet Fearne és Duffy 
(2001) alkottak meg. Koncepciójuk szerint az ellátási lánc partnerkapcsolatok teljesítményét a 
hatalom, az együttműködés és a bizalom tényezői határozzák meg. A műhelytanulmány 
kvalitatív kutatási eredmények alapján az említett három befolyásoló tényező megjelenési 
formáját és egymáshoz való viszonyát elemzi. 
Kulcsszavak: FMCG, ellátási lánc partnerkapcsolat, hatalom, bizalom, együttműködés 
  
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to introduce an on-going research and its preliminary 
results about partnerships in the Hungarian FMCG (Fast Moving Consumer Goods) -Sector. 
The Hungarian FMCG supply chains, and their basic influence tools and their relationships 
with each other are analyzed via dyadic (supplier/producer -buyer/retailer) partnerships. A 
description will be given concerning the structure of the Hungarian FMCG supply chains. 
Following Fearne and Duffy’s (2001) conception, supplier-buyer partnerships will be 
analysed through the dimensions of nature of the power structure, nature and scope of joint 
activity and relational norms.  
Key words: FMCG, supply chain partnerships, power, cooperation, relational norms  
 
Introduction 
 
In the last decade the strategic management literature stated that firms can not reach business 
successes alone in isolated environment. If they want to achieve competitive advantages, they 
have to cooperate with customers and suppliers to harmonise their information and physical 
processes. These theories have focused on cooperative supply chain concepts in every 
industry. After several mergers and acquisitions in the retail and FMCG manufacturing 
industry, the mentioned cooperation became stronger and stronger in Western-Europe and 
North-America during the 1990s. The solutions of Efficient Consumer Response, Vendor 
Managed Inventory have been applied in more and more FMCG supply chains. These trends 
have appeared in Hungary only in the second part of 1990s. After the economic transition, the 
public retail and manufacturing sector was privatised and several multinational and local 
companies appeared on the market. At the end of 1990s and early 2000s a capacity Aniko Schubert: Analyzing supply chain partnerships in the Hungarian FMCG-sector 
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consolidation has started, and the number of retailers and manufacturers has reduced. After 
this consolidation the first signs of the mentioned cooperation have appeared, but the level of 
the cooperation among FMCG supply chain members is still much lower than in western 
countries.  
The theoretical framework of this research is based on Fearne and Duffy’s (2002) conception. 
This concept was made after similar FMCG-researches in the UK supply chains. According to 
this concept the supply chain relationships’ performance is identified by three key 
performance factors: 
  The structure of the relationship economy-the nature and scope of joint activities 
undertaken 
  The structure of relationship polity-the nature of the power dependence relationship 
  The relational norms- the dominant attitudes and sentiments that exist. 
 
“These three factors combine to positively influence performance of dyadic relationships 
between strategically important buyers and suppliers-those who engage in joint activities, 
develop mutual dependence over time and exhibit trust and functional methods of conflict 
resolution. “ (Fearne-Duffy, 2001 pp.12.).  These three basic supply chain influence tools are 
in horizontal relationship, they affect each other to same extent. Their structure can be 
illustrated by Figure 1.  
 
 
1. Figure Theoretical framework of supplier-buyer relationships (Fearne-Duffy, 2001) 
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Research questions 
 
The aim of my paper is to describe basic elements of supply chain partnerships in Hungarian 
FMCG supply chains regarding to basic supply chain influence tools: power, cooperation and 
relational norms.  
 
The basic research questions of this paper are connected to the application of Fearne and 
Duffy’s model in the Hungarian FMCG- Sector: 
•  Describe the power, cooperation and relational norms appearance in the Hungarian 
FMCG-sector. 
•  Due to Fearne and Duffy’s conception: what is the internal structure of the supply chain 
partnership influence tools in the Hungarian FMCG supply chains?   
 
The mentioned research questions can be extended into wider context as follows. I will 
analyze the questions below in further phase of the research, not in this paper.    
•  What kind of additional partnership influence tools can be identified? How can the whole 
range of influence tools affect each other? 
•  Can the structure of the above analyzed influence tools be different from each other in 
case of multinational and local Hungarian supply chain members? 
 
 
Structure of my research 
 
The structure of the research can be divided into three parts. At first I started my work with 
literature review to find results and methodologies of similar researches, and to get familiar 
with the major points of these partnerships. After that I started the qualitative phase. I am 
making interviews with sales persons at multinational producers and smaller Hungarian 
producers, and category managers/buyers at multinational and Hungarian retail chains. After 
closing the second part I will create a questionnaire to measure the influence tools of the 
partnerships and distribute it among the mentioned supply chain members. I will analyze the 
results by using multivariable statistical methods. 
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Literature review 
 
Following the three basic supply chain influence tools, which were identified by Fearne and 
Duffy (2001) I have focused my literature research in order to introduce basic conceptions 
regarding power, cooperation and relational norms.  
At the power-dependence structure I will use the traditional arm’s length and partnership 
model. The basic elements of these concepts are summarized in the table below. 
 
Arm's lenght 
model
Partnership model
Nature of 
relationship
Competitive
Win-Loose Game
Cooperative
Win-Win Game
Number of suppliers Huge Limited
Length of 
relationship
Short term Long term
Contract
"Closed" or formal, 
detailed
"Opened" or informal
Conflict 
management
Redeuce conflict 
potential by detailed 
contracts
Reduce conflict potential 
by selecting partners with 
similar values and by 
increasing mutual 
understanding
Influence Throught coercion Throught expertise
Negotiating strategy
Avoide dependence 
by playing multiple 
partners off against 
each other
Create interdependence by 
limiting the number of 
partnerships
 
1. Table: Traditional points of Arm’s length and Partnership model (Kumar, 1996) 
 
The second concept, which is applied in this part, is the Bensauo- matrix (1999). Bensaou has 
identified the level of the partner-specific investments between buyers and suppliers and 
created a matrix-portfolio regarding to these investment levels. According to his findings we 
can talk about market exchange relationship, when there is no commitment between buyers 
and suppliers, and the level of their partner-specific investments is mutually low, power of the 
partners is similar. The opposite of this situation is the strategic partnership. In this case the 
level of partner-specific investments is mutually high, there is strong commitment between 
the partners, and we can talk about innovative and complex products and long term 
relationships as well. If the level of the partner-specific investments is high on the buyer’s 
side and low on the supplier’s side we can state a captive buyer relationship. In this situation 
the number of suppliers is limited, but the number of the buyers is high, and consequently 
suppliers can easily substitute the buyers. On the other side captive supplier relationship can Aniko Schubert: Analyzing supply chain partnerships in the Hungarian FMCG-sector 
 
  6
be identified, when the level of partner-specific investments is high on supplier’s side and low 
on buyer’s side. This relationship is determined by opposite characteristics than the captive 
buyer one. 
 
 The third applied concept of power structure is Cox’s (2001) points. According to Cox, the 
power structure of partnerships is identified by:  
•  number of buyers and suppliers,  
•  proportion of partner’s in buyer’s /supplier’s output,  
•  cost of partner’s substitution,  
•  product’s characteristics,  
•  information gaps,  
•  level of partner-specific investments 
•  threat of vertical integration.  
 
The above-mentioned points jointly define the nature of power positions in supplier-buyer 
relationships. According to these points Cox (2001) state 4 forms of power situation, which 
are illustrated below.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Table: Power -portfolio matrix by Cox (2001) 
 
If we compare Bensaou’s and Cox’s concepts, we can argue that their findings and power-
dependence types are very similar to each other. Market exchange relationships can mean 
independence, in case of dominant buyer’s situation we can state captive suppliers on the 
other side, and the opposite in dominant suppliers and captive buyer’s case. And most of the 
cases, when there is mutual dependence between supply chain members, strategic partnership 
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can be identified. 
 
At the analyses of the cooperation structure I will apply the concept of van Goor (2001) and 
Ellram and Hendrick (1995). Van Goor defines four stages of the cooperation between supply 
chain partners. The aim of the even stronger cooperation is to provide even faster and reliable 
supply and reduce physical and informational disruptions.  The main findings of his model are 
as follows: the cooperation levels of supply chain partners can be divided into four stages. 
Physical integration: at this phase only the physical processes are harmonised among supply 
chain members, by using similar selling units, product identity tools etc.  
1.  Information integration: in the second stage of the integration, the primary process 
(i.e. physical integration) is tuned between vendors and suppliers through information 
flow. Chain partners have to be prepared to share information that is needed to 
manage the chain as a single entity. 
2.  Control integration: At this stage one member of the supply chain takes the 
responsibility of monitoring demand, managing inventory and ensuring 
replenishment activity. 
3.  Structure integration: supply chain members harmonising their planning and 
forecasting activity, and making their innovation, product and operation development 
processes together. 
 
Cooperation’s characteristic points of Ellram and Hendrick (1995) will be also applied. 
According to their findings the major points of joint activities are as follows:  
  Futuristic orientation: future transactions, long-term expectation, suppliers are chosen 
based on total cost of ownership concept. 
  Risk sharing: willingness to help to the other partner in difficult situations, 
willingness to handle exceptions by negotiations. If the commitment in risk sharing is 
high win-win game can be identified among supply chain partners, and on the 
opposite side win-lose game can be stated. 
  Computer linkages: direct computer-to-computer links, software compatibility. 
  Corporate communication: frequent face-to-face planning/communication, many 
corporate levels of communication. 
  Information sharing/understanding: joint planning committees, buyer shares demand 
forecasts. 
  Operations information: monitoring of end results, buyers and suppliers regularly Aniko Schubert: Analyzing supply chain partnerships in the Hungarian FMCG-sector 
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studies partner’s processes. 
    
The  relational norms will be analyzed by applying the risk-based view of trust. The 
definition of risk-based trust is created by Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995). “Trust is 
willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation 
that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the 
ability to monitor or control that other party.” (Mayer-Davis-Schoorman, 1995, pp. 712.) 
Trust and risk are comparative elements, trust propensity is defined by risk propensity. 
According to Das and Teng’s (2004) concept, trust levels can be divided into two parts. 
Goodwill trust describes personal characteristics of trustee and belongs to relational risk. 
Competence trust identifies relevant knowledge and competence of trustee and belongs to 
performance risk. So if my neighbor asks me to lend him 1.000 Euros, this is a goodwill trust 
issue, because I can feel relational risk. If my neighbor asks me to found a company together, 
it is a competence trust issue. Can I trust in his competencies enough to run a company 
together with him? Barney and Hansen (1994) have defined the rationale trust and risk 
combination levels in business relationships. They identified three levels of trust and risk in 
business partnerships: 
•  Weak form of trust: in this case the relationship-specific risk is very low, there are 
limited opportunities for opportunism. The quality of goods or services that are being 
exchanged can be evaluated at low cost. The level of partner-specific investments is 
very low, transaction costs of partner’s substitution are also low. Weak form of trust 
can be the norm of highly competitive commodity markets.  
•  Semi-strong form of trust: when significant exchange vulnerabilities exist trust can 
still emerge, if parties to an exchange are protected trough various governance 
devices. Trust can be a coordination tool in these relationships, which can limit the 
opportunities for opportunism. If the cost of trust creation is lower than its benefits, 
trust will become relevant governance device in relationships. 
•  Strong form of trust: in strong form of trust, trust emerges in the face of significant 
exchange vulnerabilities, independent of weather or not elaborate social and economic 
governance mechanisms exist, because opportunistic would violate values, principles, 
and standards of behavior that have been internalized by parties to an exchange. 
Strong form of trust can be called as hard-core trust. It is more than a cultural issue, 
which can be created during decades, and its creation cost is even more than its 
benefits.   Aniko Schubert: Analyzing supply chain partnerships in the Hungarian FMCG-sector 
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Research findings 
At this part I will introduce the qualitative findings of my research. First I start the 
introduction with a general description about the analyzed sector, and after it I will apply the 
theoretical concepts of the literature review.   
Research methodology 
At the qualitative part of my research I have made eight interviews and some action research. 
The interviews were made with operational buyers at Hungarian and multinational retail 
chains, sales and supply chain managers at both local and multinational retailers. The action 
research was organized at a multinational food producer’s sales department. During the 
research session I could follow the sales managers’ tasks, the supply chains operation 
processes and the buyers’ behavior.  
Basic characteristics of Hungarian Fast Moving Consumer Goods sector 
 
Highly concentrated retail market can be described through the high market share of 
hypermarkets, horizontal cooperation among retail chains (buying groups), and even more 
independent stores join to traditional local retail chains.  
Dynamically growing and changing product portfolio. Mainstream brands are not enough to 
fulfill consumer’s requirements. There are more and more niche markets and brands.  
Low complexity of products, production technology has been well developed for decades, 
innovation concentrates on to reduce production cost and to achieve higher utilization, or to 
make the products more attractive by developing new packaging and tastes. This innovation 
activity means even growing number of SKU-s that increases the complexity of the supply 
chain. 
Reducing number of producers: capacity consolidation is continuous, fierce competition force 
producers to reduce prices in line with increasing quality and even customized supply. Only 
big producers can preserve their competitiveness in this environment, smaller ones are 
acquired in most of the cases.  
Reducing brand loyalty: producers offer very similar products in terms of quality, design, 
variety and availability.  Great variety of products urges consumers to try more and different 
ones and not to be loyal to traditional brands. The majority of the brands can be easily 
substituted with each other. 
Increasing power of private label products: the share of private label products can be higher 
than 50 per cent in many food segments (AC Nielsen, 2005). This huge market share of Aniko Schubert: Analyzing supply chain partnerships in the Hungarian FMCG-sector 
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private labels enhances retail chains power. Many local brands have lost their competitiveness 
against private labels, so producers made contract with retail chains and started to 
manufacture their products as well. There is sill overcapacity on the supplier’s side, especially 
among local producers. Concerning to it the buyers can easily find partners to have their 
private label products produced. 
Increasing customer’s requirements in  logistics solutions: producers have to ensure very fast 
and reliable supply of their products.  The standard level of service is within 48 hours. Direct 
deliveries to stores are used frequently.  
Fierce competition: fierce competition characterizes the whole supply chain. Reasons are 
derived from the statements above. 
 
Future outlook- anticipated tendencies 
 
Based on the interviews the following changes and tendencies can be anticipated in the 
analyzed sector: 
  In the next 5 years the consolidation of the retail sector will be continued, and 
probably the hypermarket, discounter and traditional local chains can be the winners 
of this tendency.  
The experts anticipated continuous growth of the hypermarket sector in the premises of bigger 
cities, rapid rise of discounters can be also expected in all cities and smaller towns as well. On 
the countryside the local retail chains network can be dominant, and the majority of 
independent stores will join to them.  
This prediction is in line with the results of a scientific research, which state that the main 
drivers of increasing share of supermarket’s are: urbanization, female participation in the 
labour force and openness to foreign competition through FDIs. This article forecasted that in 
Hungary the share of supermarkets in the retail sector will grow from 48 percent to 62 percent 
between 2002 and 2015 (Traill, 2006).  
  Increasing competition among local, multinational and private label brands.  
In this field three main tendencies are expected. First increasing concentration is expected 
among suppliers. Some manufacturers, especially the multinational and bigger local 
companies will increase their power by taking over smaller ones from the second or third tier 
mass market brands within the FMCG industry. This capacity consolidation can be stronger in 
some markets, for example diary products, waters and beverages, sweets and cookies, hard 
drinks.     Aniko Schubert: Analyzing supply chain partnerships in the Hungarian FMCG-sector 
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Second, concerning to strengthening consolidation among producers, some brands can loose 
their market shares. Due to the consolidation the large multinational companies, who produce 
strong brands can increase their market share, and their brands power. But the smaller or/and 
weaker local companies who’s brands belong to second tier categories can be caught in an 
accelerating downward spiral in market share. So big gaps can be generated between well-
known multinational and smaller local brands, and the local ones can loose their market 
position. There will be two option for the local producers to survive this situation either 
concentrating on supplying smaller regional retail chains, niche markets or producing private 
label brands. This tendency is also in line with global ones. After analyzing UK FMCG sector 
Cullen and Whelan (1996) stated that two major groups could be identified among FMCG 
brands. The group of Euro-brands or global brands is produced by big multinational 
companies who have enough resources to invest in their products innovation, supply and 
marketing activity. These are top-brands with big market share and listing in all retail chains. 
The group of trapped brands is produced by local suppliers with lack of resources to maintain 
dominant brands and they are facing a diminishing role in the future or else take over by 
larger players.   
Third the current share of private label brands will not grow as rapidly as it was in the last 
decade, but quality- and concerning to it price- segmentation is expected among private label 
products. According to this segmentation the quality focus will also appear in brand’s 
competition, because currently only price focus is dominant.   
Applying the elements of the literature review 
 
At further phases of this part I will apply the theoretical concepts which were introduced 
during the literature review. First I start to introduce my research’s findings by analyzing the 
power structure. Following Cox’s  power conception following research findings can be 
stated: 
  Number of buyers and suppliers: there is highly concentrated market on the buyer’s 
side; and currently there is still high surplus of capacities on the supplier’s side. If we 
calculate with the buying groups, there are ten retail chains, and more than one 
thousand of suppliers. The suppliers can be differentiated; many multinational 
producers have subsidiaries in Hungary also. Their power position is more 
advantageous than the majority of local Hungarian ones, because multinationals can 
negotiate on global level. The majority of retail chains are also multinational ones, 
only two of them are Hungarian, they concentrating their operation on small local Aniko Schubert: Analyzing supply chain partnerships in the Hungarian FMCG-sector 
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stores. 
  Proportion of partner’s in buyer’s supplier’s output: the hyper-and supermarkets are 
overrepresented in the supplier’s customer-portfolio. This point can be easily 
illustrated by two figures. In most of the cases one supplier can reach maximum 2-3 
per cents shares in one retailer’s supplier portfolio. On the opposite side one retail 
chain can reach from 10 to 25 per cents in one supplier’s customer portfolio 
(Interviews, 2007). At this point it is very important to talk about private label brands. 
Private label brands are very popular, due to the high price-sensitiveness of the 
Hungarian consumers. These products account for the majority (approximately 40-60 
per cent) of sales in each FMCG products’ market. This situation can be illustrated by 
the following example. Before Spar Group introduced its own label products, 90 per 
cent of soft drinks’ sales derived from Coca Cola and Pepsi. Three months after the 
introduction of private label beverages, these products have generated 60 per cent of 
the turnover (Interviews, 2007).   
  Cost of partner’s substitution: due to the above mentioned figures it is very low on the 
buyer’s side, and difficult and costly on the supplier’s side. The buyer’s can easily 
delist a supplier, but the suppliers can not loose a retailer, because in this case they can 
loose one-fourth or one-fifth of their turnover as well.  
  Product’s characteristics: complexity of the products is very low, production 
technology is well-developed, and majority of innovation concentrates on cost and 
production-effectiveness. The details of this point were mentioned at the introduction 
of the sector.  
  Information gaps: buyers are in much better position to cooperate with each other and 
get information about suppliers. 
  Level of partner-specific investments: very low, currently the retailers can realize even 
growing profit results in every segment, so they not interested in to cooperate with 
suppliers. Experts anticipate the consolidation of retail sector with the rise of 
hypermarkets, hard-discounts and local traditional chains. When trends of this 
consolidation will strengthen, cooperation between buyers and suppliers can become 
stronger as well.   
  Threat of vertical integration: is not dominant, but on the buyers side there were 
several merger and acquisition in last years, so smaller suppliers are always threatened 
buy bigger ones.  
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According to the above mentioned points it can be state that this is an arm’s length 
relationship, and in the Bensaou-matrix the majority of the partnerships are in captive 
supplier position. This is dominant buyer position in Cox’s power structure matrix. In 
some cases -between multinational partners- we can talk about market exchange 
relationships, because the dependency level of bigger multinational supplier companies is 
lower than Hungarian ones. Multinational manufacturers can negotiate on global level 
with retailers and most of the cases their brands are more valuable than Hungarian ones. 
 
At  cooperation/ supply chain integration part the application of Ellram and Hendrick’s 
points are as follows: 
•  Futuristic orientation: real futuristic orientation can not be identified in these 
relationships, because of the following points: suppliers are always chosen based 
on product’s price and rebates; the focus is always on current transactions; and 
written agreements are not longer than one year, however the duration of the 
transactions can be longer. 
•  Risk-sharing: only win-loose game can be identified in partnerships, there is low 
willingness on both sides to handle problematic situations together, majority of the 
risks are on the suppliers side. 
•  Computer linkages are only exceptions, it can be developed only in case of 
multinational partners, but suppliers have to pay refund to buyers for EDI 
connection. 
•  Corporate communication: in case of multinational suppliers and retailers it is 
informal, most of the cases it happens on weekly basis between Key Account 
Mangers and buyers. The issues of the communication concentrate on price 
promotions and supply problems. 
•  Information sharing: price information and the conditions of yearly agreements are 
always sensitive issues. Partners share only the most necessary information about 
their business, because suppliers would like to reduce their dependency level by 
not providing information about their processes to buyers.     
•  Operations information: only the turnover’s results and supply problems are 
monitored, suppliers are not interested in to understand partner’s business 
processes. 
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According to van Goor’s concept the analyzed supply chain’s integration are mostly at the 
physical  stage. In some cases when EDI connection can be found between partners, 
information stage can be stated. 
 
The basic findings of the relational norms/ risk based trust’s part can be described as follows: 
  The dominant members of the FMCG supply chains are the buyers (retailers), 
who’s risk propensity are very low, because they can easily substitute the 
suppliers. 
  According to the point above, the level of trust is very low in these relationships. 
Weak form of trust can be identified in these relationships, because of the 
substitution point, and buyers can easily coordinate their relationships by power. 
The transactional costs of trust building would be much higher than its benefits for 
them. 
 
After understanding the structure of Hungarian FMCG supply chains by the qualitative phase, 
I have created 3 hypothesizes according to the supply chains’ influence tool’s structure. I 
would like to test these hypothesizes in the next phase of my research by survey.  These 
hypothesizes were developed by using the findings of Fearne and Duffy (2001)’s theory. As it 
was mentioned before they stated horizontal relationships among power, cooperation and 
relational norms in supply chains performance. My hypothesizes analyze the relationships of 
these three elements of each other, and state the follows.   
 
H1: The power structure determinates the cooperation and integration level of the supply 
chains. 
H2: The power structure determinates the relational norms of the supply chains as well. 
H3: The cooperation among supply chain members are affected by the relational norms, 
without hierarchical relationship. 
 
So I would like to confirm by testing these hypothesizes that power structure is the most 
important tool in Hungarian FMCG supply chains, and it absolutely dominates cooperation 
and trust in the analyzed dyadic relationships.  Due to these statements the relationship among 
these elements can be illustrated as follows:  
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2. Figure: Relationship among power, cooperation and relational norms-based on my hypothesizes  
 
Research perspectives  
 
As it was mentioned in this paper the next phase of this research will be the quantitative 
testing of the hypothesizes. The theoretical framework will be analyzed and tested in wilder 
context as well. As a part of Hungarian Competitiveness Research context the Hungarian 
FMCG sector’s supply chain influence tool and their relationship will be identified, and these 
supply chain influence tool’s effect on competitiveness will be also analyzed. This research 
will also focus on whether these supply chain influence tool and their relationship different in 
case of local suppliers’ chains.    
 
 
  
Summary 
 
In this paper I have analyzed the basic influence tools of supply chain partnerships in the 
Hungarian FMCG sector. To analyze these partnerships I have applied Fearne and Duffy’s 
conception about supply chain relationships.  In the literature review I have introduced several 
concepts regarding to power, cooperation and relational norms. At the second phase of my 
paper I have introduced the results of my qualitative research by adopting the concepts, which 
were mentioned in the literature review. After it I have created three hypothesizes regarding to 
the relationships of power, cooperation and trust to each other, and I will test these 
hypothesizes in the following part of my research. In next phase of my research I would like 
to answer my second research question as well, what kind of another supply chain influence 
tools can be identified except power, cooperation and relational norms. How these newly 
identified supply chain elements effect the “old ones”? 
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